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International climate governance represents a case of shared irresponsi-
bility. The United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC),1 the Kyoto Protocol,2 and subsidiary agreements
purport to establish both shared and common-but-differentiated responsi-
bilities; yet the global community as a whole has yet to make credible and
enforceable commitments that would actually accomplish the UNFCCC’s
stated goal of preventing ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system’.3 At Cancun in 2010, the parties to the framework
convention agreed that increases in global mean temperatures should
be restricted to no more than 2° (Celsius) above pre-industrial levels,4
which would require a reduction in annual global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions of at least 80 per cent from 1990 levels by 2050.5 However, the
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1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in
force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC).
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto,
11 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 148 (Kyoto Protocol).
3 Article 2 UNFCCC, n. 1.
4 ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, COP Decision 1/CP.16 (2010), at http://
unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/session/6254/php/view/decisions.php.
5 Allianz Group and World Wildlife Fund, ‘Climate Change & the Financial Sector: An
Agenda for Action’ (June 2005), at www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/allianz_rep_0605.pdf.
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only existing multilateral mitigation agreement, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
virtually guarantees continuing net increases in global emissions of green-
house gases (GHGs).6 That Protocol was scheduled to expire at the end of
2012, but was extended as member states failed to agree on a successor
mitigation agreement that might be even slightly effective. Consequently,
the existing international regime for climate change does virtually nothing
to avoid ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.
This chapter describes the current state of ‘shared irresponsibility’
for climate change, and explores a couple of possible solutions including:
first, a liability-based approach, which some international lawyers have
been advocating;7 and second, an emerging interdisciplinary literature
recommending various ‘polycentric’ approaches that would supplement
or replace the UN process, which relies on global treaties among hundreds
of state actors with varying interests and incentives. The key for any
solution is to alter the existing incentives and/or interests of states so that
they accept and share responsibility to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
Section 2 briefly explains climate change as a collective-action problem,
which largely explains the lack of progress on climate change so far. Moving
from ‘shared irresponsibility’ to shared responsibility on climate change is
primarily a matter of resolving those collective-action problems. Obviously,
that is no easy task, but it is a task upon which game theory sheds some
light. Section 3 asks what type of ‘game’ international climate negotiations
represent. The answer to that question is important because, if the climate
‘game’ is a prisoners’ dilemma (PD), as several scholars have suggested,8
then a cooperative solution – where ‘cooperation’ amounts to accepting
and sharing responsibility – is not just unlikely but strictly impossible.
I argue, however, that the climate ‘game’ is more in the nature of an
Assurance Game with uncertain pay-offs (expected values), which has both
cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. If I am right about that, then
6 See, e.g., D.H. Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’ (2008) 61 CLP 229, at 230.
7 See, e.g., R. Verheyen,Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and
State Responsibility (Leiden:MartinusNijhoff, 2005); D.A.Grossman, ‘WarmingUp to aNot-
So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation’ (2003) 28 Col JEL 1; J. Kilinski,
‘International Climate Change Liability: A Myth or a Reality?’ (2009) 18 JTLP 377.
8 G. Brennan, ‘Climate change: a rational politics view’ (2009) 53 AJARE 309; K. Pittel and
D.T.G. Rübbelke, ‘Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s
dilemma to chicken and beyond’ (2012) 12 IEA 23; F. Grundig, H. Ward and E. R. Zorick,
‘Modeling Global Climate Negotiations’, in U. Luterbacher and D.F. Sprinz (eds.), Inter-
national Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 153. It
is not clear, however, that those scholars were referring the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ in the
strict sense in which I employ it. See section 3.
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cooperative (shared-responsibility) solutions to the climate change problem
are neither ruled-out ab initio nor ensured, but are contingent on circum-
stances, some of whichmight be within the control of state actors. Sections 4
and 5 consider alternative mechanisms for inducing greater cooperation
among actors in the climate ‘game’. Section 4 considers and rejects the
liability-based approach advocated by some international legal scholars
because of legal and procedural hurdles. Moreover, using liability to pro-
mote mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions could prove counterproduc-
tive; rather than inducing cooperation, it might reduce incentives for states
to participate in international regimes (i.e., to share responsibility). Section
5 explores, in a somewhat more optimistic vein, emerging ‘polycentric’
approaches to climate change. Such approaches are framed in various
ways – as ‘regime complexes’, ‘building blocks’, ‘tipping sets’, etc. – but they
share a supposition that sub-global (and even sub-national) processes could
bring about a more effective and robust climate mitigation regime by
altering the incentives and interests of (virtually) all states.
This chapter is more analytical than normative, but the analysis is
informed by the following normative values: first, whatever we believe about
the best (or second-best) climate policy is irrelevant if it is not feasible –
normative assertions untethered to positive diagnoses of the problems we
confront are likely to be unproductive or even counterproductive; second,
the analyses in this chapter presume a welfare-consequentialist goal, which
is, of course, fully consistent with the UNFCCC’s main objective of
‘avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’;
and third, ‘shared responsibility’ (as a reality rather than a mere concept)
cannot simply be imposed from above but must be accepted or taken by
parties. The allocation of costs and benefits of climate change or climate
change prevention is a secondary, which is not to say an unimportant,
consideration. Finally, the analysis, if it is sufficiently persuasive, could point
us in certain normative directions and away from others.
2. Climate change as a collective-action problem
Climate change is the greatest collective-action problem the international
community has confronted.9 This is true for several reasons, which I will
list before briefly discussing:
9 This section provides a very brief treatment of issues discussed at length in Cole, ‘Climate
Change and Collective Action’, n. 6. Cf. S. Barrett,Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply
Global Public Goods (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 9: ‘Global climate change may or
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1. It is an ‘aggregate effort’ problem that is truly global in scope, in that
GHG emissions from anywhere contribute to climate change every-
where.10 In other words, for any solution(s) to the climate change
problem to succeed, responsibility for mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions must be widely shared.
2. Uneven distribution of costs and benefits expected from moderate
climate change reduces incentives for wide sharing of responsibility.
3. Lingering scientific and social-scientific uncertainties about social-
welfare effects from various emissions and atmospheric concentration
levels of GHGs complicate determinations of how much mitigation is
required.
4. Concerns about energy supply and the lack of sufficient quantities of
affordable substitutes to fossil fuels for at least the next 20–30 years
create countervailing incentives for most, if not all, states.
Climate change is a problem of truly global proportions because GHG
emissions from any location in the world contribute to climate change
everywhere. A stable climate, once thought of as a pure ‘public good’
(meeting both technical requirements of non-rivalrousness of consump-
tion and inability to exclude),11 has proven to be a ‘common-pool
resource’,12 as defined by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom.13 A ‘common-pool
resource’ is a congestible or subtractable public good, where upon reaching
some threshold point of congestion, overuse, or subtraction, consumption
becomes rivalrous, though non-excludability persists. The combination of
may not be the most important problem facing us today, but it is almost certainly the
hardest one for the world to address.’
10 Barrett, Why Cooperate?, ibid., at ch. 3.
11 See, e.g., P. Cramton and S. Soft, ‘International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooper-
ation’, Global Energy Policy Center Research Paper No. 10-07 (20 August 2010), at www.
cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-stoft-international-climate-games.pdf.
12 It is extremely important not to confuse or conflate a ‘common-pool resource’ (CPR) with a
‘common-property regime’ (also CPR). The former is a resource system defined by sub-
tractibility/congestibility and non-exclusivity. The latter is a potential solution to problems
of overuse arising from nature of common-pool resources. A common-property regime is a
system of common-property rights/regulations created by local users/actors to restrict their
own access to and use of the common-pool resource. In other words, a common-property
regime is one mechanism (among others, including formal governmental regulation and
privatisation) for introducing some exclusivity where exclusivity previously was absent. See
generally E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
13 V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’, in M.D. McGinnis (ed.),
Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory
and Policy Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 75, at 77–79.
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rivalrousness in consumption and non-excludability leads ‘inexorably’
to Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’, unless exclusivity can somehow be
imposed via institutional mechanisms. Indeed, the purpose of climate
mitigation law is to introduce some amount of exclusion by fiat, pursuant
to a binding contract entered into by state actors.14
Before the Industrial Revolution, the climate system was for all practical
purposes a global public good because aggregate human emissions of
the GHGs were insufficient to push the climate system out of an equilib-
rium that was determined exclusively by natural forces. In other words,
human use of the climate system was non-rivalrous and non-exclusive. But
human emissions of GHGs since the onset of the Industrial Revolution
(generally dated to around 1850) have increased exponentially, and atmos-
pheric concentration levels of carbon equivalents have reached a threshold
level at which the stability of the climate system is threatened.15 The
climate system has reached a carbon-congestion point, which renders it a
common-pool resource rather than a pure ‘public good’.
That the climate system is now a ‘common-pool resource’ rather than
pure ‘public good’ is implicit in notions such as ‘carbon budgets’.
A carbon budget is a scientific estimate of aggregate amounts of carbon
dioxide equivalents humans (from all countries) can emit over a certain
period time (usually, the middle of this century) without breaching a
threshold at which the atmosphere, because of over-congestion of GHGs,
might tip into a new and potentially dangerous equilibrium.16 If the
global climate were completely non-rivalrous in consumption, like pure
‘public goods’, the carbon budget would be infinite.
As a matter of positive political-economy and game theory, the climate
change problem is not just about living within a carbon budget to sustain
14 I take it as given that the option of privatisation of the climate is impossible (or, at least,
infeasible). An international agreement could be conceived as taking the form either of
Hardin’s state-regulatory solution or Ostrom’s common-property solution to avert the
tragedy of open access.
15 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report, at 36–37.
16 I am using the phrase ‘carbon budgets’ as it is used in the climate policy literature, in
contrast to the very different meaning that phrase has in the ecological literature.
Compare, e.g., T. Kanitkar et al., ‘Carbon budgets for climate change mitigation – a
GAMS-based emissions model’ (2013) 104 CS 1200, at 1201 (addressing issues of
distribution of a global ‘carbon budget’ of 1000 CtCO2 for 2000–2050 to prevent
dangerous interference with the climate system); and G.M. Woodall et al., ‘Biota and
the World Carbon Budget’ (1978) 199 Science 141, at 141 (referring to the ‘carbon budget’
as a scientific determination of net sources and sinks).
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a common-pool resource. It is about doing that while securing reliable
and affordable energy supplies for both developed and developing coun-
tries.17 The existence of such inconsistent goals (given current technologies)
greatly complicates policy approaches to climate change. The main sources
of GHG emissions, including energy production and consumption, indus-
trial production, and transportation, are critical components of economic
development and growth, which no country on earth, least of all those in
the developing world, would willingly sacrifice, especially when any state’s
efforts to reduce emissions can so easily be offset by increasing emissions
elsewhere – a problem known as ‘leakage’. Any state that unilaterally
reduced its GHG emissions, at substantial cost to its economy, to ameliorate
the climate problem might be a ‘sucker’,18 as other states have incentives
to free-ride on its efforts (i.e., not to share responsibility). Those incentives
are what make climate change a collective-action problem in the first place.
If, for example, the United States, the world’s leading per capita emitter
of GHGs (and second to China in nominal annual emissions), unilat-
erally curtailed (that is, reduced to zero) its net carbon-dioxide emissions
(emissions minus sinks that absorb carbon dioxide), those reductions
would be completely offset within a few short years by increasing emis-
sions from developing countries.19 The global climate would almost
17 See Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’, n. 6, at 238–239.
18 Elinor Ostrom often stated as a truism of positive political-economy that ‘no one wants to
be a “sucker”’. See, e.g., Ostrom, Governing the Commons, n. 12, at 44; S. Crawford and
E. Ostrom, ‘A Grammar of Institutions’ (1995) 89 APSR 582, at 596.
19 In 2011, the United States was responsible for net carbon-dioxide emissions of 5.612.9
gigatons of CO2 equivalents. See US EPA, ‘Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990–2011’, EPA 430-R-13-001 (12 April 2013), at 2–4, Table 2-1 ‘Recent
Trends in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks (Tg CO2 Eq.)’. Total global
emissions that same year amounted to approximately 34 gigatons of CO2 equivalents.
See Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency,
‘Trends in global CO2 Emissions’, Table 28 A1.2. Subtracting 2011 US emissions from
that total would leave 27.4 gigatons of CO2 equivalents. Thus, in 2011 the United States
was responsible for 16.5 of global CO2 emissions; it is, after all, a major emitting country.
But developing country emissions increased in 2011 alone by one gigaton of CO2
equivalents. At that rate, developing countries would offset a complete decarbonisation
of the US economy in less than six years. This does not mean that unilateral decarbon-
isation of the US economy would not be a good thing from a climate change perspective.
To estimate its overall effect, we would have to run the numbers through an ‘integrated
assessment model’, combining emissions data and climate sensitivity models in Monte
Carlo analyses to derive a probability density function of damages from various levels of
change in global mean temperature. On the nature of integrated assessment models and
variations among them, see, e.g., E.A. Parson and K. Fisher-Vanden, ‘Integrated Assess-
ment Models of Global Climate Change’ (1997) 22 AREE 589.
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certainly benefit to a limited extent from the approximately six years’ of
grace provided by US decarbonisation, but it would merely delay by that
amount of time an overall doubling of preindustrial concentration levels
of greenhouse gases (unless the US example caused other countries to
follow suit, as hopefully it would).
The political problem of climate change is compounded by the unequal
distribution of costs and benefits that economists expect will result from
changes in global mean temperatures, rising sea-levels, and other conse-
quences.Moderate climate change is likely to createwinners (at least relatively
speaking, and perhaps nominally) as well as losers among nations. Those that
expect to ‘win’ obviously have different incentives in climate change negoti-
ations from those that expect to ‘lose’. By way of illustration (the precise
estimates of which should be taken with several pinches of salt),20 consider
Table 10.1, from a 2000 study by William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer:21
On Nordhaus and Boyer’s estimates, big losers from moderate climate
change would include India and Africa. Western Europe would also
Table 10.1 Effects of 2.5ºC GMT increase on GDP (mean estimates)
Country
Net cost (or benefit)









20 This table is merely for illustration because Nordhaus’s integrated assessment models of
climate change have evolved since 2000, and it is unlikely that the damage estimates predicted
by this particular study are spot on. Analysts using other integrated assessment models with
differing parameter values yield much higher damage estimates for all countries, including
the United States and China. See, e.g., N. Stern, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007). However, Nordhaus and Boyer’s assessment of
the relative allocation of harm among regions reflects a general consensus. No economic
assessment of moderate climate change suggests that all areas of the world will be (more or
less) equally harmed or benefited. All economists agree that the countries likely to suffer the
most harm are precisely the countries that have historically emitted the least GHGs.
21 W.D. Nordhaus and J. Boyer, Warming the World: Economics Models of Global Warming
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), at 91, Table 4.10.
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suffer significant harm, while the United States, China, and Eastern
Europe would suffer very little socio-economic harm. Russia would
actually be a net beneficiary of moderate climate change, which goes
some way toward explaining why Russia held out for ‘side payments’
(in the form of ‘hot air’ credits, which are emissions allowances unrelated
to actual emissions) to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol.22
Whenever some members of the international community expect
to win while others lose, negotiating treaties that would distribute gains
and losses while balancing conflicting imperatives, such as climate
stability and energy security, becomes problematic. The equilibrium
solution is overwhelmingly likely to be the lowest common denomin-
ator of all the parties – something like the Kyoto Protocol – which
would not resolve the problem.23 In other words, to the extent parties
agree to share responsibility at all, the level of aggregate responsibility
will be insufficient.
Just as importantly, we lack technological substitutes for fossil fuels
that would allow states to decarbonise, if not painlessly, then at least
at some reasonable cost.24 According to the International Energy Admin-
istration’s World Energy Outlook 2012, fossil fuels (coal, gas, and oil) are
expected to continue supplying the vast majority of the world’s energy
needs at least through 2030, a period during which global energy demand
is expected to increase by more than one-third.25 During that same
period we need to be in the process of reducing global emissions of
GHGs by approximately 80 per cent to avoid exceeding a target concen-
tration level of 450 parts per million by 2050.26 It is a tall order, even
assuming (perhaps heroically) that states quickly become more willing
than they have been so far to cooperate.
Given the facts of the climate problem, it is not surprising that more
than two decades of international negotiations have so far produced
22 D.H. Cole, ‘Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action’, Institute for Policy
Integrity New York University School of Law, Working Paper No. 2009/1 20–22 (May
2009), at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/2009_1.pdf, at 21.
23 Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’, n. 6, at 254; M. Inman, ‘The climate change
game’ (2009) 3 NRCC 130, at 132.
24 This is part of what makes the climate change problem so very different from, and so
much more difficult than the ozone problem. Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective
Action’, n. 6, at 238–242.
25 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, at www.worldenergyoutlook.
org/publications/weo-2012/.
26 IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III, Box 13.7, at www.ipcc.ch/index.htm.
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disappointing results. Agreements have been few, and achievements
modest at best. The agreements include
• a workable but weak framework convention, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change;27
• a frail and seriously flawed (but recently extended) mitigation treaty,
the Kyoto Protocol,28 which by design is fully consistent with a net
increase in global GHG emissions;29 and
• a mixed bag of (legally non-binding) add-ons to the Kyoto Protocol,
including REDD+,30 theMarrakech Accord,31 and the Copenhagen Accord.32
Because the climate agreements, and their various problems, have been
comprehensively canvassed in both scholarly and popular literatures,33
this chapter will not review them except insofar as they relate directly to
recommended mechanisms for enhancing shared responsibility in the
sections that follow.
3. The nature of the climate change game
Climate change often is portrayed as a Prisoners’ Dilemma ‒ perhaps the
ultimate PD.34 Were that truly the case, no purpose would be served
trying to conceive cooperative solutions because PDs, properly under-
stood, do not allow for cooperative solutions.35 Given the pay-off
27 See http://unfccc.int/2860.php. 28 Kyoto Protocol, n. 2.
29 See, e.g., Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’, n. 6, at 230.
30 REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is an offset
programme that developed separately from the UNFCCC process but has since been
incorporated into it. See ‘About REDD+’, UN-REDD Programme, at www.un-redd.org/
aboutredd/tabid/582/default.aspx.
31 ‘The Marrakesh Accords’ and ‘The Marrakesh Declaration’, at http://unfccc.int/cop7/
documents/accords_draft.pdf.
32 Ibid.
33 Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’, n. 6; D. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton University Press, 2001);
Q. Scheirmeier, ‘The Kyoto Protocol: Hot air’ (2012) 491 Nature 656.
34 P.J. Wood, ‘Climate Change and Game Theory’ (2011) 1219 ANYAS 153, at 168; D. Helm,
‘Climate change policy: why has so little been achieved?’(2008) 24 OREP 211, at 234;
T. Irwin, ‘Implications for climate-change policy of research on cooperation in social
dilemmas’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5006 (1 July 2009), at 3.
35 Often, the label ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (PD) is used quite loosely to describe all manner of
problems that might or might not have cooperative solutions. Indeed, it has become
fashionable to talk about cooperative solutions to iterative PD games, but as I have
pointed out before, any PD (single-play or iterative) that admits any cooperative solution
is not strictly speaking a PD. The only way a cooperative solution to a PD can exist is to
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structure of a PD (which is what makes a PD a PD), non-cooperation is a
unique Nash equilibrium solution. The only way a cooperative solution
can be achieved is by altering the pay-offs (which would make the PD no
longer a PD, but some other kind of game).
However, the climate change game is not a PD because, like virtually all
other common-pool resource problems,36 it possesses multiple equilibria,
which might be either cooperative or uncooperative. In other words,
climate change is in the nature of what Amartya Sen has called an
‘Assurance Game’, which possesses uncertain, probabilistic pay-offs
(expected values rather than certain values). Those pay-offs are determined
by an array of variables, most notably levels of trust, which depend in turn
on factors such as credibility of commitments and the ability to monitor
performance and sanction non-compliers. Those factors affect the per-
ceived probability that, if the first mover cooperates (e.g., accepts responsi-
bility to mitigate GHG emissions), so then will subsequent movers.37
In the Assurance Game, pay-offs are not certain values but expected
values with probabilistic pay-offs, where p is a probability assigned to a
pay-off. In its simplest form, the pay-off matrix appears as follows: 38
With expected values as specified in the matrix, cooperation (shared
responsibility) is the dominant strategy for both parties so long as the
probability of mutual cooperation remains above 0.75.39 But if the
probability of mutual cooperation falls to 0.74, then the expected value
from cooperation falls to 4.92, which is lower than the pay-off from
Player 2
Cooperate Defect
Player 1 Cooperate p27, p17 (1-p2)-1,5
Defect 5,(1-p1)-1 5,5
change the pay-offs, in which case the problem is no longer (and may never have been) a
true PD (which by definition entails a single non-cooperative solution as a Nash equilib-
rium). See D.H. Cole and P.Z. Grossman, ‘Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem
Is Not a Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (2010) 69 TD 219.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. See also A. Sen, ‘Isolation, assurance, and the social rate of discount’ (1960) 81
QJE 112.
38 From Cole and Grossman, ‘Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem Is Not a
Prisoners’ Dilemma’, n. 35, at 228.
39 EV1 = (.75) 7 + (.25)-1 = 5.
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defection (5). At that point (and at all probabilities lower than 0.75),
non-cooperation on climate mitigation would become the dominant
strategy – sometimes referred to as a ‘risk dominant’ strategy.40 In reality,
of course, the climate change game is iterative and long-form, involving
many more than two parties; and the probabilistic pay-offs presented in
the simple two-by-two matrix would only represent expected valuations
of cooperation and non-cooperation at each decision node in the iterative
game. In addition, the losses suffered from non-cooperation may not
be symmetrical between the parties, as the pay-off matrix presupposes.
However, the pay-off matrix does accurately illustrate the multiple equi-
libria of an Assurance Game.
In the climate change context, the probability of mutual cooperation is
based largely on the credibility of commitments, which in turn reflect
the relative ease of monitoring and enforcing those commitments.41 The
greater the credibility of commitments to abate GHG emissions, the more
likely major emitting countries would be to attain a more efficient (in the
aggregate) equilibrium. The greater the level of distrust – the less countries
believe that others would follow their lead in cooperating – and the greater
their level of risk aversion (not for climate change itself but for investments
to resolve the problem), the more likely the global community would
remain at a globally inefficient equilibrium, possibly equivalent to the
outcome of a PD. So, even if the climate change game is not, strictly
speaking a PD, it might turn out like one.42 Indeed, such an outcome
seems more likely than not at present, given the lack of progress on
cooperative solutions. But unlike the strict PD that undesirable outcome
is not preordained by the pay-offs, which in a PD are deliberately struc-
tured by the criminal justice system.43 The current bad equilibrium in
climate negotiations might be flipped to a better equilibrium, although just
how this might be accomplished remains uncertain and contested.
40 R. Gardner, Games for Business and Economics (New York: Wiley, 1995).
41 S. Barrett, ‘Credible Commitments, Focal Points, and Tipping: The Strategy of Climate
Treaty Design’, in R.W. Hahn and A. Ulph, Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays
in Honour of Tom Schelling (Oxford University Press, 2012), 29; S. Barrett, ‘Climate
treaties and the imperative of enforcement’ (2008) 24 OREP 239.
42 Accord S. Barrett and A. Dannenberg, ‘Climate negotiations under scientific uncertainty’
(2012) 109 PNAS 17372. Barrett believes that the current pay-off structure of pay-offs to
climate negotiations remain like those of a PD. See S. Barrett, ‘Climate treaties and
approaching catastrophes’ (2013) 66(2) JEEM 235.
43 Cole and Grossman, ‘Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem Is Not a Prisoners’
Dilemma’, n. 35, at 221, 223, 224.
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4. Can liability motivate shared responsibility for
climate change mitigation?
If the climate change game has at least the potential for a cooperative
equilibrium, as I have suggested, the next task is to identify potential
mechanisms that might shift players toward such an equilibrium solu-
tion from the current uncooperative equilibrium. This section assesses
two general recommendations for improving the incentives of GHG
emitting countries to cooperate in reducing their emissions: first, a
liability-based regime under which countries harmed as a result of
climate change might sue countries alleged to have caused the harm
(a la the Trail Smelter arbitration); second, a ‘polycentric’ approach to
climate policy-making that might (or might not) dispense with the
UNFCCC process. Any polycentric approach (or set of such
approaches) would allow for (relatively speaking) ‘bottom-up’ develop-
ment of climate policies via unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral state,
regional, and local actions. Such actions would provide an opportunity
for experienced-based learning about what works and does not work at
various levels of climate governance. Recognising, of course, that no
panacea (or one-size-fits-all) solutions exist for the climate change
problem (excluding the negligible possibility of an unexpected short-
term technological change that would immediately provide reliable and
inexpensive substitutes for fossil fuels), experimentation with multiple
potential solutions is more likely to prove fruitful (over time) than
continuing down a singular, globally negotiated path that has been
fruitless since its adoption more than 20 years ago.
One solution, promoted with increasing frequency, even desperation,
by international legal scholars,44 is litigation to establish state liability
for extraterritorial harm resulting from the GHG emissions of major
emitting countries, such as the United States. Harm from climate
change already is manifest in various locales around the world, but
nowhere more so than in low-lying islands and peninsulas, where
climate change-induced sea-level rise is inundating land and displacing
persons. For instance, the island of Kutubdia, off the coast of Bangla-
desh, is rapidly sinking into the Bay of Bengal. In just the last 20 years,
the island’s total area has been halved, six of the island’s villages have
been swamped, and 40,000 of its inhabitants have fled to higher
44 See, e.g., Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7, at ch. 6.
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ground.45 The question is whether those poor climate refugees and the
government of Bangladesh should be entitled to compensation from
countries such as the United States and the European Union (EU) that
are responsible for the lion’s share of GHG emissions over the past 150
years? As a matter of simple justice, the answer to this question seems
obvious: states should be liable for environmental harm, including
climate harm, they cause to other states and their citizens. Very quickly,
however, difficult legal, jurisdictional, and policy questions arise, which
belie facile answers.
4.1 The notion of ‘state responsibility’ in international law
It has been argued, with substantial justification, that the international
legal notion of state responsibility is ‘not well adapted to the environ-
mental field’46 on several grounds, including (a) the absence of a consen-
sus definition of ‘environment’ (not a trivial matter when the extent of
state responsibility depends substantially on that term’s definition); (b)
the brute fact that ‘in modern society, damage to the environment cannot
be completely avoided’,47 but is ‘inherent in industrial development’;48
and (c) the ‘disgraceful solidarity of States in front of the degradation of
the human environment to which they all contribute’.49 Indeed, one
might posit the existence of an international customary principle of
environmental abuse. Nevertheless, state responsibility for international
environmental harms is well established, if only in the minds of inter-
national lawyers.
Norms of international environmental protection have emerged since
the early twentieth century primarily from two sources: first, treaties and
other agreements, which are quasi-contractual arrangements establishing
45 J. Vidal, ‘Sea change: the Bay of Bengal’s vanishing islands’, The Guardian, 29 January
2013. Similar stories have been told about low-lying Pacific Island nations, such as
Tuvalu. See, e.g., ‘Tuvalu about to disappear into the ocean’, Reuters, 13 September
2007. But according to recent reports several of those coral atolls have actually been
growing in size, rather than shrinking. See N. Bryant, ‘Low-lying Pacific islands “growing
not sinking”’, BBC News, 3 June 2010 (claiming that Tuvalu and other low-lying islands
will ‘still be there in 100 years’ time’, but might not be habitable). Disparate factual claims
about whether or not islands are sinking highlights the kind of evidentiary problems that
claimants of climate harm might confront before international courts and tribunals.
46 C. Nègre, ‘Responsibility and International Environmental Law’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet,
and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press,
2010), 803, at 803–804.
47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.
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mutual legal responsibilities among states (which may be shared equally
or ‘common but differentiated’);50 and second, the customary inter-
national legal principle of ‘no harm’, according to which states (sup-
posedly) have a general duty to avoid engaging in acts causing substantial
extraterritorial environmental harm.51 Breaches of treaty-based or cus-
tomary law-based duties can give rise to state liability. However, even in
the strongest factual circumstances imaginable, such as Bangladesh suing
the United States for harm to Kutubdia and its residents, a negative
outcome is predictable at a fairly high confidence level.
4.1.1 Potential liability under the UNFCCC and
Kyoto Protocol
First, consider the source of potential legal liability. Bangladesh could try to
sue the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under
the UNFCCC or the customary no-harm rule, but not under the Kyoto
Protocol. Because the United States has not ratified the Protocol, it is not
legally bound by its terms. So, immediately, the most prominent source of
legal climate mitigation obligations is off the table. Of course, other parties
to the Kyoto Protocol might be sued (e.g., for violating emission-reduction
obligations). But even assuming some parties are in violation of those very
modest obligations, it is not clear that a basis for litigation exists because
subsidiary agreements to the Protocol establish automatic (if ineffective)
penalties for noncompliance,52 which could be read to preempt party-v.-
party lawsuits, under the international legal doctrine of lex specialis.53
50 The UNFCCC imposes a shared obligation to avoid dangerous climate change, but the
Kyoto Protocol creates ‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities with respect to
mitigation: only developed countries (listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC) have specific
emissions-reduction targets under the Protocol.
51 See section 4.1.2.
52 The primary penalty for failure to meet emission-reduction obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol is a 30 per cent reduction in the emissions-reduction target for the following
compliance period. Decision 27/CMP.1 (2005), Annex, ‘Procedures and mechanisms relat-
ing to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, at www.ciesin.
columbia.edu/repository/entri/docs/cop/Kyoto_COP001_027.pdf. The penalty is much less
significant than it appears because a penalised party is allowed to ‘borrow’ from one
compliance period to the next, and so never actually has to suffer the penalty. X. Wang
and G. Wiser, ‘The Implementation and Compliance Regimes under the Climate Change
Convention and Its Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11 RECIEL 181, at 196.
53 According to the doctrine of lex specialis, special rules of international law take precedence
over more general rules governing state responsibility. Article 55 of the ILC’s Articles on
State Responsibility provides that its ‘articles do not apply where and to the extent that the
conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or
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Moreover, suing co-parties of treaties hardly provides a solid basis for
further cooperation in ongoing negotiations to develop a workable global
mitigation regime. For example, a lawsuit against the EU, which arguably
has taken more action to mitigate emissions than any other state actor,
would do little to encourage it to take more action, and might actually
discourage EU member states from cooperating.
But what about a theoretical lawsuit against the United States for
violating its legal obligations under the UNFCCC, which the United
States has ratified? A threshold question is whether the UNFCCC
imposes legally enforceable obligations to reduce GHG emissions.
Scholars have offered different answers to that question: on one view,
the UNFCCC imposes only very limited legally enforceable obligations,
which do not include actual emission-reductions;54 on another view, the
UNFCCC imposes actual, though not specific, emission-reduction obli-
gations.55 Probably the strongest case for a legally enforceable commit-
ment to reduce emissions is found in Article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC,
which provides that parties ‘shall adopt national policies and take corres-
ponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases’.56 As Michael Faure and
André Nollkaemper have observed, this provision, though ‘still rather
vague’, nevertheless ‘stipulate[s] a commitment’ and ‘arguably could be
the basis of a liability claim’.57
implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law.’ See Articles on Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts,
ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA). Scholars disagree about the applicability of lex specialis
in the context of the climate treaties. Compare Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and
International Law, n. 7, at 143 (arguing that lex specialis does not apply) and T. Thorp,
‘Climate Justice: A Constitutional Approach to Unify the Lex Specialis Principles of Inter-
national Climate Law’ (2012) 8 Utr LR 7, at 15 (providing reasons to believe that lex specialis
does apply to the climate treaties, preempting other remedies).
54 D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
A Commentary’ (1993) 18 YJIL 451; S. Barrett and R. Stavins, ‘Increasing Participation
and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements’ (2003) 3(4) IEA 349, at
350 (referring to the UNFCCC’s goal of reducing GHG emissions from developed
countries as ‘non-binding’).
55 See, e.g., Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7. Some scholars
seem caught in between these two groups. See M. Faure and P.A. Nollkaemper, ‘Inter-
national Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change’
(2007) 26A Stan ELJ 123.
56 Article 4(2)(a) UNFCCC, n. 1.
57 Faure and Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Com-
pensate for Climate Change’, n. 55, at 143.
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Obviously, if the UNFCCC does not create legally binding obliga-
tions, the inquiry is complete. But let us suppose, following Faure and
Nollkaemper (among others), that Article 4(2)(a) creates a binding
obligation on which liability might be based. Has the United States
failed to ‘adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on
the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emis-
sions of greenhouse gases’? The US Environmental Protection Agency
has imposed substantive regulations limiting power-plant and automo-
bile emissions of greenhouse gases, under the Clean Air Act.58 The
federal government also has established by regulation a schedule for
the social cost of carbon (SSC), which all executive branch agencies
must factor into their regulatory analyses.59 By raising the estimated
costs of major federal regulations that might result in emissions of
GHGs, the SSC presumably (at some point) would affect actual
emissions.
Are those ‘policies and measures’ sufficient to meet the obligations
created by Article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC? If not, do state and regional
policies to reduce GHG emissions, including California’s ‘Global
Warming Solutions Act’,60 also count as US measures to comply with
UNFCCC obligations? Unfortunately, the Convention itself fails to
specify any metric for judging the sufficiency of state efforts to reduce
GHG emissions. It only calls on parties to implement policies and
measures that would reduce GHG emissions as against business as
usual, and that the United States has done.61 Even China, which has
no obligations under Article 4 of the UNFCCC, has established policies
and measures designed to reduce its GHG emissions as against business
58 Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 USC. For descriptions of current EPA regulations relating
to climate change, see www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.
html; www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_
ria_2013_update.pdf. A rule regulating carbon emissions from new power plants
currently is in the process of being finalised. The proposed rule can be read at www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660-0001. In addition, the
Obama Administration recently announced that it would promulgate a rule regulating
carbon emissions from existing power plants. See Executive Office of the President,
‘The President’s Climate Action Plan’ (June 2013), at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
59 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government, Tech-
nical Support Document – Technical Update on the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory
Impact Analysis – Under Executive Order 128666 (May 2013), at www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_ria_2013_update.pdf.
60 Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assembly Bill 32. 61 See n. 50 and 51.
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as usual,62 which underscores just how easily any legal burden the
UNFCCC actually creates might be satisfied.
Even accepting at face value the most optimistic interpretation of the
UNFCCC for invoking liability, the practical wisdom of such a move is
questionable. Given the strong disagreements that characterised the
UNFCCC’s negotiation, and the compromises necessary to create even
a modest ‘framework convention’, imposing liability on member states
for violating provisions of such a framework convention could well
prove counterproductive. More than anything, sued parties might
become inclined to simply withdraw from the treaty. And what
recourse would that leave harmed states? Perhaps even more import-
antly, what would be the prospective effect on future negotiations of
‘framework conventions’ about sensitive, complex, and highly conten-
tious issues? Would countries become more likely or less likely to sign
on to documents they believe represent only a first step toward negoti-
ating a fully-fledged regime, but which could later might be
(re-)interpreted as a source of legal liability? The question would seem
to answer itself.
The real possibility that states might withdraw from the UNFCCC to
avoid liability, if an international tribunal used it as a basis for liability,
reflects a more general problem with litigating violations of multilateral
treaties. In most cases, states could avoid liability for violating treaties
simply by exiting them.63 Indeed, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto
Protocol, which it previously had ratified, ostensibly for that reason.64
The fact of free withdrawal underscores the fact that ‘responsibility’
cannot be imposed from above in the international climate regime but
must be voluntarily accepted.
62 D.I. Stern and F. Jotzo, ‘How ambitious are China and India’s emissions intensity targets?’
(2010) 38 EP 6776 (concluding that China will have to adopt ambitious carbon mitigation
policies to achieve its voluntary carbon-intensity target).
63 In rare cases, such as the Ozone Accords (Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, et al.)
states cannot avoid the ban on production and sale of listed ozone-depleting substances
simply by withdrawing from the accords because the treaties including trade sanctions to
enforce compliance, including against non-parties. See, e.g., J.D. Werksman, ‘Trade
Sanctions Under the Montreal Protocol’ (2006) 1 RECIEL 69. Trade sanctions do not
appear, however, in most environmental treaties, including the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol. And while their use in the Ozone Accords has not yet led to problems, the use
of trade sanctions in international agreements can give rise to disputes before the World
Trade Organization. See generally S. Barrett, ‘The strategy of trade sanctions in inter-
national environmental agreements’ (1997) 19 REE 345.
64 ‘Canada pulls out of Kyoto protocol’, The Guardian, 12 December 2011.
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4.1.2 Potential liability under the customary ‘no-harm’ rule
The overall weakness of the international climate treaty regime has led to
the promotion of a liability-based regime, using the ‘no-harm’ rule of
customary international law, not so much as a substitute but as a spur to
international negotiations.65 The basic idea is that if recalcitrant states,
such as the United States, can be made to pay for the harm their GHG
emissions cause in other countries, they will be incentivised to share
responsibility by reducing their GHG emissions and engaging more
positively with the rest of the international community in multilateral
negotiations resulting, hopefully, in more effective climate treaties. But it
remains to be seen whether litigation under the no-harm rule is a viable
option; and even if it is, it might not create the positive incentives to
share responsibility that its proponents anticipate.
In order to establish liability under the no-harm principle, following
the lone precedent of the Trail Smelter arbitration, a claimant would have
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that emissions originating in
the defendant state caused it injury of ‘serious consequence’.66
Proponents of the liability-based approach to GHG mitigation, including
Roda Verheyen, argue forcefully that these burdens are not especially
onerous. In my view, the legal obstacles are more formidable than some
international lawyers suppose, as evidenced by the fact that not a single
harmed country has so far even attempted to bring a claim (even for
declaratory judgment, which avoids the need for voluntary acceptance
of jurisdiction by the defendant country or countries) against a major
emitting country.
To illustrate the problems a climate plaintiff would confront, let us
take as a hypothetical case Bangladesh v. US, for harmed caused to the
Island of Kutubdia and its residents. To give the complaining country
the strongest possible case, assume that the facts, as stated, are true: the
Island of Kutubdia’s total area has been halved, six of the island’s
villages have been swamped, and 40,000 of its inhabitants have fled
to higher ground. Further assume that the causal link between
65 See, e.g., J. Gupta, ‘Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to
Address Climate Change’ (2007) 16 RECIEL 76, at 85 (concluding that ‘the potential
threat of future litigation . . . might itself give strong incentives to governments to address
climate change more seriously’); D. Hunter, ‘The Implications of Climate Change Litiga-
tion for International Environmental Law-Making’, in W. Burns and H. Osofsly (eds.),
Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches (Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 357.
66 Trail Smelter (United States of America v. Canada), Award, (1938) 3 RIAA 1905, at 1965.
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anthropogenic GHG emissions and rising global sea-levels is reasonably
robust; and that Bangladesh and the United States both submit to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. The question presented to the ICJ is whether
the United States has breached its duty towards Bangladesh to ensure
that actions in its territory do not cause harm of ‘serious consequence’
to the territory of another state.
In order for Bangladesh to prevail on that question several elements
must be established, including most prominently causation, foreseeabil-
ity, and harm of ‘serious consequence’. Given the facts, there can be little
doubt that the injuries suffered by Bangladesh from sea-level rise are of
‘serious consequence’. But to what extent did emissions from the United
States cause those injuries? Put in a different way that more clearly
highlights the problem, had the United States not emitted the GHGs
that contributed to rising sea levels, would the consequences for the
Island of Kutubdia be substantially less ‘serious’?
The question presumes that the United States could be held liable only
for the damage caused by its own emissions. Some climate liability
proponents suggest that international courts might adopt a rule of joint
and several liability,67 under which the United States could be held liable
for the all the harm from global emissions of GHGs, but with a right to
sue those other countries for contribution. Other scholars have observed
that no such rule exists in international law.68 Article 47 of the Articles
on State Responsibility allows for liability of a ‘plurality of responsible
States’.69 The Commentaries to the Article make clear that each respon-
sible state is liable only for the harm it individually causes.70 In this case,
we are concerned with the potential responsibility of the United States for
damage to Bangladesh from sea-level rise; and under the ARSIWA, the
United States will be held liable, if at all, only for the injuries arising from
emissions emanating from its territories.
The scientific basis for resolving questions of attribution of climate
damages remains soft. We possess a fair idea of historic US contributions
to global GHG emissions since the middle of the nineteenth century:
67 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7, at 268–273.
68 I. Brownlie, System of the Law of the Nations: State Responsibility, Part I (Oxford
University Press, 1983), 189.
69 ARSIWA, n. 53; J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013), 327.
70 Commentary to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2) (ARSIWA Commentary), Commentary to Article 47
ARSIWA.
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approximately 29 per cent.71 But quantifying the overall human effect,
independent of natural drivers, for purposes of establishing legal respon-
sibility remains problematic.72 Scientists are ‘very confident that most of
the observed large-scale changes in surface temperature over the twenti-
eth century are externally driven’.73 But ‘externally driven’ does
not equate to human-caused.74 Relevant external factors include anthro-
pogenic aerosol cooling, solar activity, and volcanic activity, as well as
anthropogenic GHG emissions.75 Disentangling those factors is a tricky
business. While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has concluded unequivocally that the climate is warming, and that ‘most
of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-
twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropo-
genic GHG concentrations’,76 it has not yet attempted to quantify the
human contribution to climate change in a way that would be useful
for litigants and jurists.
Ten years ago, the Oxford physicist Myles Allen cautioned that more
scientific research was required to resolve the problem of attribution before
emitters could be held legally liable for the impacts of their emissions.77
Arguably, that remains the case today for states as well as for private
emitters. Liability proponent Roda Verheyen puts great stock in a single
study attributing 60–70 per cent of observed warming to anthropogenic
emissions with an extremely high level of certainty.78 Whether the ICJ
would put so much stock in a single study, when the IPCC itself has yet to
provide a percentage attribution at any confidence level, is doubtful. And
in the absence of an overall attribution level of global mean temperature
increase to anthropogenic emissions, no one can assert with confidence
how much of the global mean temperature increase can be attributed
specifically to American emissions, let alone how much sea-level rise is
attributable to emissions from the United States.
71 K.A. Baumert, T. Herzog, and J. Pershing, ‘Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas
Data and International Climate Policy’ (World Resources Institute, 2005), at 32, Fig. 6.1.
72 See generally M. Allen et al., ‘Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human
Influence on Climate’ (2007) 155 Penn LR 1353.
73 Ibid., at 1370. 74 Ibid., at 1371. 75 Ibid., at 1374.
76 IPCC, 2007 Synthesis Report, n. 15, at 30, 39.
77 M. Allen, ‘Liability for climate change’ (2003) 421 Nature 891, at 891–892.
78 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7, at 259, citing J. Grieser,
T. Staeger and C.-D. Schönwiese, Statische Analyse zur Früherkennung globaler und
regionaler Klimaänderungen aufgrund des anthropogenen Treibhauseffektes. Berichte des
Instituts für Meteorologie und Geophysik (Frankfurt am Main: Eigenverlag des Instituts,
2000).
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Even if we could determine state attribution with a degree of accuracy
that might persuade the ICJ, the foreseeability of harm remains at issue.
Liability proponents argue with substantial justification that at least since
1992 the potential harm from GHG emissions has been foreseeable.79 But
if state responsibility only dates from 1992,80 then, as Roda Verheyen
and co-author Richard Tol note, the ambit of the no-harm rule would
envelope not just the United States and other developed countries, but
also China, India, and other developing countries that have been emitting
GHGs in increasing quantities since that date.81 As a consequence, the
extent of potential US culpability would shrink. Based on data from
the US Energy Information Administration,82 in 1990 the United States
was responsible for approximately 23 per cent of global emissions (below
its average of 29 per cent contribution from the mid-nineteenth century
to 2002).83 By 2011, the United States was responsible for just 16.5 per
cent of global GHG emissions.84 If we simply average those two figures,
the United States would be responsible for 19.75 per cent of the foresee-
able harm suffered by Kutubdia from anthropogenic GHG emissions
(that is, minus natural forces driving global mean temperatures and
sea-level rise). If human emissions are responsible for, say, 60 per cent
of total increases in global mean temperatures and sea-level rise since
1992 (a significant assumption to be sure), then US responsibility for
Kutubdia’s harm would by 19.75 per cent of 60 per cent, or about 12 per
cent. China’s liability could turn out to be roughly similar.
One final, vitally important, procedural issue remains to be resolved:
the standard of proof for the claimant to prevail. Roda Verheyen has
called for a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, according to which
79 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7, at 181. See also R.S.J. Tol
and R. Verheyen, ‘State responsibility and compensation for climate change damages – a
legal and economic assessment’ (2004) 32(9) EP 1109, at 1118.
80 Tol and Verheyen, ibid. suggest earlier dates for establishing foreseeability, including
1827, when Fourier first posited a relationship between concentrations of carbon dioxide
and radiative forcing in the atmosphere, and the 1950s, when monitoring data from
Antarctica and Hawaii provided a basis for the first in-depth research on the implications
for the global climate of increasing atmospheric concentration levels of GHGs. But given
the extent of scientific uncertainty, 1992 seems a more reasonable date on which to base
foreseeability.
81 Ibid.
82 See ‘World Carbon Dioxide Emission by Region, Reference Case, 1990–2030’, at http://
photos.mongabay.com/09/forecast_co2.jpg.
83 See n. 71 and accompanying text.
84 D. Clark, ‘Which nations are most responsible for climate change?’, The Guardian, 21
April 2011.
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the claimant only has to show that its injuries more likely than not
resulted from the defendant’s conduct.85 But our only existing precedent,
the 1935 Trail Smelter arbitration, expressly established a more burden-
some ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. Scant reason exists to
presume, especially in the absence of any test case, that the ICJ would
abandon that precedent today. Assuming the ICJ followed the Trail
Smelter tribunal in applying a ‘clear and convincing’ evidence standard,
the consequences for Bangladesh’s hypothetical case against the United
States would be potentially fatal. Even the staunchest advocate of liability
for climate harm would have a difficult time arguing that the existing
scientific basis for assessing cause-and-effect relations between emissions
from a specific country and specific harms somewhere else is sufficiently
advanced to meet such a standard of proof.
In sum, a liability claim for harm from climate change based on the
customary no-harm rule remains an uphill fight for any claimant. That
could explain why we do not see climate claimants rushing to the ICJ,
despite the encouragement of several international law scholars, who are
like lawyers in search of clients.86 Another reason is the virtual certainty
that defendant states would not agree to be tried before the ICJ. Once
again, they only have to share responsibility if they want to do so. In the
absence of mandatory jurisdiction, a prospect no one considers realistic,
any suggestion that a liability regime might play a significant role in
ameliorating climate change seems pie-in-the-sky.
This conclusion might be tough to accept for lawyers, who are by
training and temperament accustomed to look to the courtroom as a
85 Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law, n. 7, at 291, 331.
86 In 2011, the governments of Palau and the Marshall Islands, small island nations in the
Pacific, asked the United Nation’s General Assembly (UNGA) to seek an advisory
opinion from the ICJ, under Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations, addressing
the responsibility of GHG-emitting states to ensure that emissions arising within their
boundaries do not harm other states. ‘Palau seeks UN World Court opinion on damage
caused by greenhouse gases’, United Nations News Service, 22 September 2011. Individ-
ual countries cannot themselves request advisory opinions from the ICJ, but can ask the
UNGA to do so. A UNGA request would be in the form of a resolution enacted by
majority vote (of those states that cast votes), which is not easily obtained. So far, the
UNGA has not acted on the request of Palau and the Marshall Islands. If it did so, the
question would be submitted to the ICJ, but the Court would not necessarily be bound to
answer the question submitted; and if it did answer the question, its advisory opinion
would not be binding; nor would it provide any remedy. The only advantage of seeking
an advisory opinion as Palau and the Marshall Islands have done, as opposed to filing a
direct claim for harm, is that the UNGA resolution requesting an advisory opinion
obviates the requirement of consent by ‘defendant’ states.
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primary forum in which to redress grievances. We lawyers naturally react
to unjust social and environmental insults by looking for some ‘wrong-
doer’ to sue (even if it seems, as in the case of GHG emissions, that
everyone is a ‘wrongdoer’ to some extent). And legal liability sometimes
has proven a useful tool for environmental protection, at least in domes-
tic courts (though not in the climate-change context).87 The fact remains
that we hardly ever see environmental claims brought before inter-
national tribunals. The Trail Smelter arbitration remains a unique excep-
tion (albeit one that seems to have spawned a vast rule). Scant reason
exists for optimism about the prospects for spurring shared responsibility
for climate change via litigation, let alone resolving the climate-change
problem, one court case at a time.
5. Polycentric approaches to climate change: of ‘regime
complexes’,88 ‘building blocks’,89 ‘bottom-up approaches’90 and
‘tipping sets’91
If international courts are unable to contribute significantly to a global
climate change solution, we are forced back onto a political process that
so far has proven incapable of coming to grips with the problem. But the
fact that global negotiations have made little progress so far does not
mean progress is impossible. In the first place, and contrary to facile
nostrums, such as ‘global problems require global solutions’,92 global
agreements are not a sine qua non for progress. Scholars from diverse
disciplines have, in recent years, started calling for more ‘polycentric’
87 Even the strongest tort claims in domestic courts have failed. See Native Village of
Kivalina and city of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. and others, 696 F. 3d 849 (9th
Cir. 2012), (rejecting claim for relocation costs by tribal village in Alaska inundated by
rising seas).
88 R.O. Keohane and D.G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 10–33 (January 2010).
89 R.B. Stewart, M. Oppenheimer, and B. Rudyk, ‘Building Blocks for Global Climate
Protection’, NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization, Law and Economics
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12–43 (January 2013).
90 R. Leal-Arcas, ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches for Climate Change Negotiations:
An Analysis’ (2011) 6 IUPJGPP 1.
91 G. Heal and H. Kunreuther, ‘Tipping Climate Negotiations’, in R.W. Hahn and A. Ulph
(eds.), Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling (Oxford
University Press, 2012), 50.
92 See, e.g., M. Grasso, ‘A normative ethical framework in climate change’ (2007) 81
Climatic Change 223, at 224.
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approaches to climate governance, arguing that the UN process should
not be (if it ever has been) the ‘only game in town’.93
A diversity of polycentric approaches has been recommended, includ-
ing, in brief:
• ‘Building blocks’, which are smaller-scale regional or sectoral policies
that can be linked together.94
• A ‘regime complex’, comprised of ‘highly fragmented collections of
institutions, with no identifiable core and weak or nonexistent linkages
between regime elements’.95
• A ‘bottom-up approach . . . that begins with details and works up to the
highest conceptual level’, as found for example in the field of invest-
ment protection, which relies on more than 2,700 bilateral investment
protection agreements and virtually no multilateral agreements.96
What do these various ‘polycentric’ approaches have in common, and
how would they differ from the existing UNFCCC approach? All global
or multilateral legal regimes are multi-scalar in the trivial sense that they
inevitably rely on member states (sharing responsibility) for implemen-
tation and compliance. A ‘polycentric’ approach to climate change
represents not only governance at multiple scales, but nodes of decision
making at various levels of governance that are not necessarily hierarch-
ical. Instead of lower-level government agencies simply carrying out
orders from above, polycentrism envisions an array of government-
service providers, interacting with one another and with consumers of
public goods or ‘common-pool resources’. Some of those government-
service providers may be organised in hierarchies a la business firms in
markets for private goods. But they may also be competitive, in the sense
that they offer alternative approaches to resolving similar problems.
Thus, in a polycentric system providers of public goods and services
both compete and cooperate in providing public goods and services
93 E. Ostrom, ‘Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global
solutions to climate change before taking action at other scales?’ (2012) 49 ET 353; D.H.
Cole, ‘From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance’ (2011) 2 Climate Law 395. See
also J.E. Aldy, S. Barrett, and R.N. Stavins, ‘Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global
Climate Policy Architectures’ (2003) 3 CP 373 (observing that ‘[e]nvironmentalists have
supported the Kyoto Protocol partly because it has been “the only game in town”’).
94 Stewart, Oppenheimer and Rudyk, ‘Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection’, n. 89.
95 Keohane and Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, n. 88, at 3–4.
96 Leal-Arcas, ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches for Climate Change Negotiations’,
n. 90, at 4, footnote 19.
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that private markets are likely to under-supply because of the inability to
internalise sufficient private benefits.97
The chief implication of a polycentric approach for climate change
governance is not (necessarily) the abandonment of global negotiations
under the UNFCCC, but reduced reliance on the UN process as the sole
or even predominant mechanism for obtaining GHG emissions reduc-
tions from major emitting countries. The focus would not shift to any
particular substitute process; rather, a multiplicity of processes, in the
nature of policy experiments, would be encouraged. Experiments that
prove promising would be emulated, scaled up (if feasible), and perhaps
linked with other promising and compatible systems. While not strictly
‘bottom-up’ in the conventional economic (Hayekian) sense of that
term,98 polycentric climate institutions might be referred to as relatively
bottom-up, in the sense that they evolve from national or even sub-
national policy experiments, rather than global-level negotiations, which
often crowd out national and sub-national experiments and learning.
The impetus toward a less centralised approach to climate change did
not come from a single source but emerged over the course of a few years
among a diverse group of scholars, including Elinor Ostrom, Robert
Keohane, David Victor, Richard Stewart, and the present author. In some
respects, their recommendations have been less normative than positive –
recognising that climate policy already was becoming polycentric, as
governance units at various levels, including some private actors, were
implementing policies and measures of their own outside the purview of
the UNFCCC process. In some cases, their actions reflected dissatisfaction
with the pace of global negotiations; in other cases, lower-level actions were
taken in anticipation of national or international developments (not all of
97 On the polycentric approach generally, see V. Ostrom, C. Tiebout, and R. Warren, ‘The
Organization of Government inMetropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry’ (1961) 55 APSR
831; V. Ostrom, ‘Polycentricity (Part 1)’, in M.D. McGinnis (ed.), Polycentricity and Local
Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
(University of Michigan Press, 1999), 52; V. Ostrom, ‘Polycentricity (Part 2)’, in M.D.
McGinnis (ed.) Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis (University of Michigan Press, 1999), 119.
98 See, e.g., W. Easterly, ‘Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?’ (2008) 98 AER 95
(referring to ‘bottom up’ in the traditional economic sense of spontaneous emergence
of institutions from social norms, customs, traditions and values of individuals, as
opposed to the ‘top-down’ imposition of institutions by political leaders). In the climate
policy context, ‘bottom-up’ typically refers to institutional mechanisms deployed at the
sub-global level by political leaders (or entrepreneurs). See Leal-Arcas, ‘Top-Down and
Bottom-Up Approaches for Climate Change Negotiations’, n. 90.
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which have materialised). Whatever their impetus, the various policies and
measures introduce at different levels of public and private governance are,
in effect, experiments in climate policy, which scholars and policy analysts
might assess for potential emulation, scaling up, and linkage.
Following is a select (and far from complete) list of policies and
measures adopted at national and sub-national levels over the past
several years, but not as Kyoto Protocol compliance mechanisms:
• US EPA regulations of greenhouse gases.
• China’s unilateral promise (now codified) to reduce its carbon-
intensity of production.
• California’s ‘Global Warming Solutions Act’.
• The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
• Portland, Oregon’s plan to reduce GHG emissions by 20 per cent below
1990 levels by 2010.
• Berkeley, California’s FIRST programme (to finance residential solar-
heating systems).
• The Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI), created in 2002 by ten large
cement manufacturers to reduce GHG emissions in production.
• The now-defunct Chicago Climate Exchange, a private emissions-
trading market.99
• British Petroleum’s early efforts to reduce carbon emissions from
pipeline leaks.100
These are all examples of public and private governance units at various
levels accepting responsibility for reducing GHG emissions, in most cases
without any direct connection to UN-based structures. Jouni Paavola has
provided a handy table (Table 10.2) illustrating the variety of sub-global
mechanisms that are already in use (somewhere) to mitigate GHG
emissions:101
Even the EU’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS),102 which started
as a Kyoto compliance mechanism, has attained an identity distinct
99 For details on this programme and the others listed above, see Cole, ‘From Global to
Polycentric Climate Governance’, n. 93, at 406–409. See also J. Paavola, ‘Climate Change:
The Ultimate Tragedy of the Commons?’, in D.H. Cole and E. Ostrom (eds.), Property in
Land and Other Resources (Cambridge Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Press, 2012), 417, at 426 (discussing the Cement Sustainability Initiative).
100 See J. Browne, ‘Beyond Kyoto: The Carbon Challenge’, FA, July/August 2004.
101 Paavola, ‘Climate Change: The Ultimate Tragedy of the Commons?’, n. 99, at 428,
Table 14.1.
102 See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm.
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from the Kyoto Protocol, offering an alternative path to climate miti-
gation. Elsewhere,103 I have written about the EU ETS’s more modest,
careful, and altogether superior approach to emissions trading, com-
pared to the Kyoto Protocol. The EU Commission, which designed the
ETS, learned lessons (that the Kyoto parties ignored) about conditions
(and limits) for successful emissions trading from earlier US experi-
ments, such as the Clean Air Act’s acid rain programme. Although the
EU ETS suffers from some well-known design flaws of its own, includ-
ing the lack of an allowance price-floor to avert financial collapse of
carbon markets in the wake of economic recession,104 its dominant
Table 10.2 Institutional Diversity in Polycentric Climate Change
Governance







































103 Cole, ‘From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance’, n. 93, at 409–411.
104 See, e.g., European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council, ‘The State of the European carbon market in 2012’, COM(2012)
316 daniel h. cole
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316227466.011
21 Dec 2016 at 14:38:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge Books Access paid for by The Indiana University Maurer School of Law, on
position as the world’s largest and most well-developed market pro-
vides an opportunity, at least, for it to serve as a more reliable and
replicable alternative to Kyoto’s irredeemably flawed trading and offset
programmes. In fact, when it designed the ETS, the European Commis-
sion fully intended to influence the future development of global carbon
markets.105 That is to say, it was taking responsibility for promoting a
more effective global carbon market.
Because the EU and its member states are such large players in
virtually all emissions markets (mostly as buyers), they can and have
de facto amended the Kyoto Protocol via domestic legislation to
improve the environmental integrity of trading markets. For example,
when the EU amended the ETS in 2009 to prohibit member states from
complying with ETS targets by using Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) credits from fraud-ridden HFC-23 projects in China, that
unilateral act (which took effect in 2013) has pretty much ended
China’s scam, which was facilitated by inherent defects (e.g., reliance
on counterfactual emissions) in the design of the CDM programme.
The EU also has unilaterally adopted an ambitious emissions-reduction
target of 20 per cent by 2020, offering to increase that emissions-
reduction target to 30 per cent if other major emitting countries shared
responsibility by committing to emissions reductions of 20 per cent.106
So far, other major emitting countries have not followed suit. The EU
has also tried to cajole major emitting countries into sharing responsi-
bility for GHG emission reductions by unilaterally imposing carbon
taxes on international flights to and from EU destinations.107 That
effort has not worked, either. But the main point is that the EU has
demonstrated how actions taken at a regional or domestic level can
have a salutary effect on GHG emissions.
To the extent other countries replicate the EU ETS or design some-
thing even better, which can be linked with the ETS and other, similar
652 final 10 (14 November 2012), at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/docs/
com_2012_652_en.pdf (discussing a price floor as one option to reduce volatility and to
prevent price drops resulting from temporary economic disruptions).
105 Cole, ‘From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance’, n. 93, at 410.
106 European Commission, ‘EU greenhouse gas emissions and targets’, at http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/g-gas/index_en.htm. See also J. Cludius, H. Forster and V. Graichen,
‘Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in the European Union: An Overview of the Current Policy
Landscape’, World Resources Institute Working Paper, November, 2012, at www.wri.
org/publication/ghg-mitigation-eu-policy-landscape.
107 See, e.g., ‘EU freezes controversial aviation carbon tax’, EUbusiness, 13 November 2012.
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trading markets, a global carbon market might emerge (though not
spontaneously) from ‘bottom-up’. Such formal linkages would amount
to an actual sharing of responsibility for climate change mitigation. The
EU’s recent agreement to link its ETS with Australia’s new trading
scheme is one small step in that direction. The EU has also held prelimin-
ary talks with California about linking the world’s two largest carbon
trading markets.108 Should that happen, those linked national- and sub-
national-level schemes could completely supplant the Kyoto Protocol’s
fatally flawed mitigation programmes, yielding a net improvement for
global climate policy.
Perhaps even more importantly, combined efforts of major emitting
countries (taking and sharing responsibility) could tip global climate
negotiations into a more cooperative equilibrium.109 As Geoffrey Heal
and Howard Kunreuther have explained, a ‘tipping set’ of countries
taking action on climate change could create a ‘net return to the choice
of this strategy for other agents’.110 In other words, they could alter the
incentives of other states to favour a broader distribution and sharing of
responsibility for reducing emissions. This has happened before, for
example in the global switch from leaded to unleaded gasoline. That
switch involved three major incremental costs: first, innovating a reli-
able and cost-effective anti-engine-knock alternative to lead-based gas-
oline; second, adapting refineries to produce the new fuel; and third,
modifying auto engines to use it. The United States led in innovating
and mandating alternatives, which other countries could then easily
adopt. Once the United States mandated lead-free gasoline (domestic-
ally), American automakers were required to adjust car designs accord-
ingly. Automakers in other countries could not, of course, be required
to play by American rules except on American soil. But the United
States is such an important export market for most Japanese and
European car-makers that those companies had market incentives to
modify their engines accordingly. Once the alternative gasoline formu-
las and engines to burn it were widely available, the costs to all other
countries of moving to unleaded fuel were ‘negligible’.111 In this case,
shared responsibility for reducing atmospheric lead levels was spurred
108 F. Carus, ‘EU plans to link emissions trading scheme with California’, The Guardian, 7
April 2011.
109 On the idea of ‘tipping points’ generally, see T.C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macro-
behavior (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978).
110 Heal and Kunreuther, ‘Tipping Climate Negotiations’, n. 91, at 55. 111 Ibid., at 53.
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by the unilateral acceptance of responsibility by a single country, the
United States.
Climate change undoubtedly represents a more difficult problem to
solve than taking the lead out of gasoline – not least because of the lack of
available substitutes for fossil fuels. Indeed, all of Heal and Kunreuther’s
examples of successful tipping sets involve technological substitutions
that are not on the near-term horizon for carbon-based fuels.112 How-
ever, Heal and Kunreuther demonstrate generally that
the climate negotiation game has a tipping set if (a) the cost of joining a
treaty drops as the number of joiners rises; (b) there is a cost to not
joining that is constant or rising with the number who have joined; and
(c) if once a sufficient number have joined this cost exceeds the cost of
joining for those who have not yet joined.113
A group of cooperating countries (sharing responsibility) is far more
likely to constitute a ‘tipping set’ if they are ‘strategically important
countries’, defined as those having ‘the largest reinforcing effects on
others’.114
We already know that the EU cannot be a tipping set of one in climate
negotiations, despite its proven ability to amend de facto elements of the
existing global regime. Whether the eventual combination of carbon
trading schemes in the EU, Australia, and California might provide a
‘tipping set’ is uncertain. Indeed, there is reason to doubt the existence of
tipping set for climate policy that does not include either China or the
United States. However, those two countries recently began bilateral
negotiations on GHG reductions, which potentially could lead to a
‘tipping set’.115 Simply put, if a relatively small set of countries cannot
112 For a non-technological example of a tipping mechanism, see Barrett, ‘Credible
Commitments, Focal Points, and Tipping’, n. 41, at 45, noting that, if a critical mass
of countries join a treaty with trade restrictions as a compliance enforcement
mechanism, other countries will have an incentive to join and comply. The Ozone
Accords successfully used trade restrictions as a tipping mechanism. Even in that
case, however, the availability of technological substitutes to ozone-depleting sub-
stances (ODSs) were crucial to the successful negotiations, including presumably the
agreement to impose trade sanctions as an enforcement device against both parties
and non-parties. It is extremely unlikely that the Montreal Protocol would have been
agreed to, with or without trade sanctions, but for the existence of reliable and not-
too-costly ODS substitutes. See Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’, n. 6, at
239–241.
113 Heal and Kunreuther, ‘Tipping Climate Negotiations’, n. 91, at 57. 114 Ibid.
115 See, e.g., H. Schneider, ‘U.S., China agree on climate steps to curb emissions’, Washing-
ton Post, 10 July 2013.
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tip global climate negotiations towards a potential welfare-improving
equilibrium, little hope exists for global climate negotiations to find a
better equilibrium. Either way, shared responsibility cannot be imposed
but must be accepted.
6. Conclusion
Global climate negotiations have made little progress since the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which itself marked no real progress
towards resolving the climate change problem. Despite the well-meaning
efforts of climate negotiators and the intellectual contributions of inter-
national lawyers, global negotiations have become so paralysed that even
marginal improvements to the Kyoto Protocol’s ineffectual regime have
remained out of grasp. In frustration, some legal scholars have begun
calling for litigation against perceived recalcitrant states, such as the
United States. At best, litigation is unlikely to do much good; at worst,
it could create disincentives for major emitting states to take on any
treaty-based obligations. Even if liability might be imposed (which seems
unlikely), responsibility must be accepted or taken voluntarily.
Another option is to broaden the focus of attention from the global
roving cocktail party of climate negotiations, with their thousands of
participants, to smaller-scale efforts currently arising all over the world to
actually reduce carbon emissions. Rather than dismissing those efforts as
meaningless for a global problem like climate change, scholars and policy
makers ought to be studying the actions of those who are actually taking
responsibility to see which lower-level programmes are effective and
might be emulated, scaled-up, and/or linked with other programmes to
create a ‘regime complex’ or a ‘tipping set’ that could lead to a broader
sharing of responsibility for climate change mitigation. Such efforts are
not a quick fix, let alone a panacea solution for climate change. After all,
the Assurance Game of climate change does not guarantee cooperative
solutions. But less formal and more consistent communication and trust-
building efforts between individual, major emitting countries could
hardly yield worse results than the formal, global negotiations of the
UN process. Hardly a ringing endorsement or a prediction of great
success for polycentric approaches, but it realistically reflects the
daunting nature of the collective-action problem we confront.
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